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THOMAS

K.

PLOFCHAN, JR.*

Recognizing and Countervailing
Environmental Subsidies**
Currently, throughout the world, an environmental movement is underway
with the goal of assuring that the world's natural resources are cleaned and
preserved. The cleaning and preservation is being accomplished through initiatives by governments and other public organizations as well as the efforts of
private individuals and organizations. However, international advancement in the
development of norms by which environmental issues may be measured is limited by the relative infancy of the international environmental movement. ' Development of norms is also limited because much of the activity surrounding
international control of the environment results, at best, in "soft" law. Such law
2
does not yet possess the authority or respect of established legal doctrine.
Consequently, the international community should benefit from doctrinal or
theoretical approaches that permit development of mechanisms that establish and
enforce international environmental norms through the application of hard international law. 3 This article suggests that "hard" law mechanisms exist that permit
the development and enforcement of international environmental norms, at least
*Ph.D. candidate, Wilson School of Government & Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia;
LL.M. candidate, University of Virginia School of Law; J.D., University of Virginia School of Law.
Research Associate, Center for National Security Law, University of Virginia School of Law. The
author would like to thank Royal Daniel and Donald Boudreaux for their advice and suggestions with
regard to this piece.
**The editorial reviewer for this article was Kevin M. Harris.
1. The 1972 Stockholm Declaration adopted by the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, which is recognized as establishing the normative environmental program for the world
community, is not even twenty years old. See Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and the International
Law of the Environment, 12 MICH. J. INT'L LAW 420, 422 (1991).
2. See generally Dupuy, supra note 1, at 420-21. "Soft" law "constitutes part of the contemporary law-making process but, as a social phenomenon, it evidently overflows the classical and
familiar legal categories by which scholars usually describe and explain both the creation and the
legal authority of international norms. In other words, soft law is a trouble maker because it is either
not yet or not only law." Id. at 420.
3. "Hard" international law is defined as those international normative constraints that are
recognized as possessing some compulsory or enforceable authority.
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with respect to one major category of the world's pollution-that deriving from
industrial production.
The following analysis suggests that, in some instances, international trade law
may be used as an instrument for effecting an increase in worldwide environmental
protection. This article is not a case study, as cases proposing such an approach
to environmental norm creation do not exist. As mentioned above, in lieu of
litigation, the development of international environmental norms has to date relied
almost exclusively on the activity of the United Nations, regional organizations,
and other nongovernmental organizations and their subsequent elaboration of
"soft" law concepts. Thus, this largely theoretical article is meant as an initial
exploration of the feasibility and practicality of applying hard international trade
law as a means of developing international environmental norms. Consequently,
it identifies the strengths and weaknesses of such an approach. The article's conclusions are intended to fuel a substantive appraisal of the means by which trade
law can be used to develop international environmental norms.
I. Trade Laws and Market Efficiency
The analysis assumes that a governmental policy that does not impose environmental protection requirements upon industry within its jurisdiction could
easily be considered a subsidy. Consequently, states that provide such subsidies
may be subject to international trade regulations designed to eliminate statesponsored subsidization of the world market. Thus, by enforcing international
trade regulations against environmental subsidies, enforcing states may compel
subsidizing states to recognize these subsidies, eliminate them, and consequently contribute to the development of international environmental norms.
Theoretically, any action that allows one producer to have an artificial advantage over another is a subsidy. 4 An investment in technology to make production
more efficient is, therefore, a private subsidy. Furthermore, one may argue that
the lack of environmental restrictions on an industry's means of production or
disposal may also be viewed as a subsidy. Unfortunately, this argument does not
necessarily mean that a lack of environmental restrictions is a subsidy as intended
by international trade laws, or that the subsidy is countervailable.
Understanding the limits, purposes, and intentions of international trade laws
is essential to understanding the link between environmental controls on industrial production and countervailing duties. The major international trade law is
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 5 This multilateral trade
agreement is designed to result in the lowering of tariffs among the participating
4. An accepted legal definition of a subsidy is "a grant of money by government in aid of the
promoters of any enterprise, work, or improvement in which the government desires to participate,
or which is considered a proper subject for government aid, because such purchase is likely to be of
benefit to the public." BLACK's LAW DICrIONARY 1280 (5th ed. 1979).
5. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, October 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1948) [hereinafter GATT].
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states, thereby promoting free trade. The goal of the treaty and all U.S. trade law6
is to promote free trade and the maximization of international market efficiency.
Market efficiency results "when free trade allows each country to specialize
by exporting those goods it can produce most efficiently and importing those
goods that it can produce only at a higher cost." 7 Underlying the concept of
market efficiency is the ideal that the natural influences of supply, demand, and
scarcity determine prices and resource allocation. 8 Implicit in this ideal are two
considerations: costs are properly recognized; and only supply, demand, and
scarcity should determine price and resource allocation. Consequently, the GATT
and U.S. trade laws provide means for eliminating those factors other than
supply, demand, and scarcity that may influence the price of imported goods in
a country, representatively the United States.
Such factors include those government policies that are designed to influence
the price of imported goods. Duties are policies that increase the price of imported goods and are imposed by the importing country. Subsidies are the policies that decrease the price of exported goods and are granted by the exporting
government of the state in which the exporting firm is located. The goal of the
GATT, and other international trade laws designed to improve market efficiency,
is the eventual elimination of duties and subsidies.
Duties and subsidies are directly related in that the imposition of a duty by an
importing country creates an incentive for an exporting country to provide a
subsidy. The converse is also true: the creation of a subsidy by an exporting
government creates an incentive for the importing state to impose a duty on those
subsidized goods. Thus, if the GATT or other international trade laws are to be
effective in bringing about an efficient international market, they must provide
means of halting the reactive imposition of duties and the granting of subsidies.
In essence, any discussion of the creation of international environmental 9norms
addresses the application of trade laws to halt the granting of subsidies.
II. Defining Subsidies
Unfortunately, for those wishing to curtail the granting of subsidies, subsidies
are somewhat amorphously defined and consequently difficult to regulate. Some
6. See Comment, Implementation and Policy: Problems in the Application of Countervailing
Duty Laws to Nonmarket Economy Countries, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1647 (1988).
7. Id. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE U.S., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, U.S. LAWS AND REGULATIONS APPLICABLE TO IMPORTS FROM
NONMARKET ECONOMIES COULD BE IMPROVED 5 (1981); John L. Barcel6, Subsidies and Countervailing Duties-Analysis and a Proposal, 9 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 779, 786-88 (1977); Daniel K.
Tarullo, Beyond Normalcy in the Regulation of International Trade, 100 HARv. L. REV. 546, 549-51
(1987). See generally PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 626-30 (11th ed. 1980) (explaining the
theory of comparative advantage).
8. See Carbon Steel Wire Rod From Czechoslovakia, 19 C.F.R. § 353 (1991) (Dep't Comm.
1984) (final determination).

9. This article assumes that the imposition of a duty in response to a subsidy will not regenerate the
cycle and thereby create an incentive for the exporting government or industry to increase its subsidy.
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scholars apply an expansive definition to the term "subsidy," arguing that almost
any governmental policy or practice that benefits an industry qualifies as a
subsidy.' 0 Fortunately, the world community has recognized that the lack of
specificity inherent in such a definition would make regulation nearly impossible.
Consequently, international trade law significantly narrows the scope of the term
"subsidy" to exclude most of the familiar activities of governments. Thus, such
routine activities of governments that provide economic benefits to a range of
industries, including "public education, government-financed highway and railway systems, national telecommunications networks, and even national defense
activities" usually are not considered subsidies.
In promulgating international trade laws that would eliminate those practices
antithetical to international market efficiency, the GAIT and U.S. law have
codified specific definitions and practices that can be considered subsidies and
which are subject to responsive action. These laws distinguish export subsidies
2
from domestic subsidies. 1
Export subsidies may be roughly defined as "any government program or
practice that increases the profitability of export sales but does not similarly
increase the profitability of sales for domestic consumption."', 3 Domestic subsidies are those governmental programs that are sufficiently targeted "to a specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or industries,' 14 and that
provide advantage to the producers not found in the marketplace. 15 The value of
a subsidy is not the cost of the subsidy to the granting government, but the benefit
received by the target industry. 16
10. Comment, supra note 6,at1662 ("Some scholars, however, argue that subsidies are manifested in almost any government policy that benefits an industry."); see JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD
TRADE AND THE LAW OF

GATT § 30.1, at 366 (1969); Mundheim & Ehrrenhaft, What Is a "Sub-

sidy" ? A Discussion Paper, in INTERFACE THREE: LEGAL TREATMENT OF DOMESTIC SUBSIDIES 95 (D.
Wallace et al. eds., 1984) (cited in Comment, supra note 6, at 1662 n. 104, as "discussing the status
of government job training programs, relaxed environmental restriction, depreciation rules, government purchases, and industry-specific research and development grants as domestic subsidies").
11. Alan 0. Sykes, Countervailing Duty Law: An Economic Perspective, 89 COLUM. L. REv.
199, 204 (1989).
12. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (1992).
13. Sykes, supra note 11,at203-04 ("Examples include government payments to manufacturers that are contingent upon export volume, the manipulation of market-determined exchange rates
to favor export sales or production for export, the provision of goods or services by the government
for use in the production of goods for domestic consumption, and a variety of other practices.").
14. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B) (1992).
15. Id. U.S. statutory law includes a nonexhaustive list of potential domestic subsidy programs
or practices:
(I) The provision of capital,
loans, or loan guarantees on terms inconsistent with commercial
considerations.
(II)The provision of goods or services atpreferential rates.
(III)The grant of funds or forgiveness of debt to cover operating losses sustained by a specific
industry.
(IV) The assumption of any costs or expenses of manufacture, production, or distribution.
19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(A)(ii)(l)-(IV) (1992).
16. Certain Textile Mill Prods. from Mex., 19 C.F.R. § 353 (1991).
VOL. 26, NO. 3
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Purpose and Applicability of Duties

To halt the use of these subsidies and guarantee the efficiency of the market,
the GATT and other international trade laws permit the imposition of a countervailing duty on the subsidized goods arriving for import. The duty offsets the
subsidy. 17 It is important to recognize that a countervailing duty is different than
an antidumping measure.
"The purpose of the antidumping law is to offset the competitive advantage
enjoyed by foreign manufacturers over United States producers as a result of unfair
pricing schemes." ' 8 The easiest way to describe the practice is that a foreign
producer sells its product more cheaply in the United States than it does in its own
country.' 9 Because dumping results from a disparity in fair market prices between
the two countries, there is no need to show that the producer is selling its goods
abroad at a loss. 20 However, the determination of dumping occurs through a
comparison of the product's fair value with the U.S. sales price-there is no
21
presumption that the imported product's domestic price is fair.
Antidumping measures result because of a producer's subsidy. In contrast,
countervailing duty laws operate when foreign manufacturers have an unfair
competitive advantage over domestic manufacturers because of subsidies granted
to the exporter by the exporter's government. 22 The principle behind countervailing duty laws is the same for antidumping laws-domestic producers should
only have to compete with those foreign firms that are subject to the same
competitive market constraints. 23 Original proponents of countervailing duties
argued their necessity because: "subsidies create an 'artificial' advantage, which
if left uncorrected would distort the pattern of trade and destroy the industry of
the importing nation-'natural advantages possessed by one country ought not to
be offset by artificial aids afforded by another.' ,24 Consequently, the United
States Government has used countervailing duties for some time as an important
25
tool of U.S. trade policy.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See 19 U.S.C. § 1671e(a)(1) (1982).
Comment, supra note 6, at 1652-53.
Id. at 1653.
See Comment, supra note 6, at 1670 n.157

21. See EUGENE T. RoSSIDES, U.S. IMPORT TRADE REGULATION 198 (1986).

22. House Comm. on Ways and Means, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., Overview and Compilation of
U.S. Trade Statutes 40 (Comm. Print 1987). See JOHN BARTON & B. FISHER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AND INVESTMENT 281 (1986) ("[lit is usually a firm that dumps but a government that subsidizes .... "); Comment, supra note 6, at 1658 ("The purpose of United States countervailing duty
laws is to offset the unfair competitive advantage that foreign manufacturers enjoy over domestic
producers as a result of subsidies granted by foreign governments to their industries.").
23. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE U.S., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, U.S. LAWS AND REGULATIONS APPLICABLE TO IMPORTS FROM
NONMARKET ECONOMIES COULD BE IMPROVED 6 (1981).
24. Sykes, supra note 11, at 199 (citing 30 CONG. REC. 2203, 2225-26 (1897) (remarks of Sen.
Caffrey)).
25. See id. at 200 ("Beyond question, therefore, countervailing duties are an increasingly

important tool of U.S. trade policy, and recent developments suggest no end to that trend.").
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However, countervailing duties, under the GATI, are only applicable in those
instances where a subsidized export causes or threatens to cause material injury
to one of the importing country's domestic industries. 26 U.S. law 27 requires a
determination of material injury before imposing countervailing duties against
those countries that are subject to the GATT or a similar agreement. 28 For those
countries that are not subject to the GATT or a similar agreement, countervailing
duties may be imposed before a determination of material injury is made.2 9
IV. Questions Concerning the Applicability
of Countervailing Duties
Given this background in the scope of international trade law and countervailing duties, several questions immediately arise when considering whether the
lack of an environmental policy in an exporting country is a subsidy that is
countervailable by an importing country whose industries are required to conform to strict environmental laws. First, do industries that operate in countries
without strict environmental laws adequately recognize costs of production?
Second, does a policy that does not require the recognition of environmental
costs of production add another factor to supply, demand, and scarcity-thereby
distorting market efficiency and the efficient determination of price and resource
allocation?
If the answers to the first two questions are in the affirmative, is the lack of
strict environmental controls on production an export subsidy? If not, does the
lack of controls qualify as a domestic subsidy that may be countervailed against
by an importing country? Next, if lack of environmental controls is considered
a subsidy, how does one determine material injury, and how should the subsidy
be valued? Finally, even if the lack of strict environmental controls on production
is a subsidy, material injury is determined, and the subsidy is valued, is the use
of countervailing duty laws the best way to address the problem?
In answering the first two questions a hypothetical is useful. Country E is a
developing nation and has only one industry, X. X produces widgets in its only
factory at a cost of $1 per widget. Production by X is in accordance with the laws
of E. However, E is known for its lax environmental controls of production, and
X in its manufacturing process, pollutes the only river in E: the same river that
is used for drinking water. In order to provide adequate drinking water, E cleans
up the river. Thus, for each widget sold in E, the citizens of E must pay $1 per
widget plus the cost of cleaning the water. If X produced 100 widgets and the
water cleanup costs $100, then the cost of cleanup per widget would be an
26. See GATT, supra note 5, art. VI, para. 5.
27. The authority for the imposition of countervailing duties under U.S. law has existed since the
Tariff Act of 1897. Sykes, supra note 11, at 199.
28. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(2) (1982).
29. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(2) (1982) (no injury test required under § 303).
VOL. 26, NO. 3
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additional $1 per widget. Consequently, one may fairly argue that X has erred in
its determination of the cost of producing widgets30as the true cost is at least $1
per widget plus $1 for water cleanup per widget.
Given the true cost of $2 per widget, the answer to the first question becomes
obvious. Industries that produce goods in countries without strict environmental
controls on production may not adequately assess the cost of production. Thus,
the answer to the second question also appears obvious. If producers do not
incorporate all costs of production, they cannot adequately measure demand
because they do not include the increasing scarcity of environmental resources in
their equation. Consequently, producers can neither properly price nor properly
allocate resources. In short, improper cost recognition distorts the view of31market efficiency, resulting in the perception of efficiency when none exists.
Given that the lack of environmental controls on a specific industry results in
a distortion of market efficiency, conceivably a governmental policy that rejects
these controls or fails to incorporate them can constitute a subsidy in the broadest
definition of the term. Unfortunately, the lack of a specific subsidy definition
may be utilized both by proponents of treating the lack of environmental controls
as a subsidy and those who do not wish to see such a determination made. This
situation is present because neither U.S. countervailing duty law, the GATT, nor
the GATT Subsidies Code defines the term. 32 "The countervailing duty laws
merely provide that the terms mean the same as the terms 'bounty' and 'grant'
' 33
as used in section 303.
The existence of broad definitions does not sufficiently answer the question of
whether the subsidy is countervailable. In order for a subsidy to be countervailable, it must be an export subsidy or a countervailable domestic subsidy. Because
of the ambiguity in defining the word "subsidy," analysis is best limited to the
determination of whether government policy meets the standards established by
the definitions of export and domestic subsidies established earlier. 34 Could such
a policy constitute an export subsidy?

30. The value of the subsidy is not necessarily the cost of the widget plus the cost of cleaning
up the water. The value of the subsidy includes the foregoing value to the victims of the externalities.
In other words, it must include the cost the citizens must expend to get water, including the
importation of water if necessary. This hypothetical assumes that cleaning the water is the cheapest
way for the citizens to get water. If the citizens could import water for $.50 per widget per unit of
water, that price would define the subsidy, not the price of cleaning the water, as it is the real measure
of the foregone value of not having clean water in the country.
31. It is well recognized in economic theory that improper valuation results in subsidies, which
in turn distort the internal price structure of the country. This distortion in turn leads to greater prices
on other goods, which become more scarce because production facilities that would normally be used
to produce other goods would be diverted to produce the subsidized goods. For an excellent discussion of subsidies and economic theory, see generally H. HAzLrrr, ECONOMICS INONE LESSON (1979).
32. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(A) (1992) (defining the term "subsidy" to include "[a]ny export
subsidy described in Annex A to the [Subsidies Code].").
33. Comment, supra note 6, at 1662; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(A), supra note 32.
34. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
FALL 1992
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To qualify as an export subsidy the government would have to provide a policy
that lowers the cost of exported goods without similarly affecting domestic
goods. It seems possible, but not very likely, that the lack of government-required
environmental controls will qualify as an export subsidy. Recalling the production scenario of country E, an export subsidy would exist if the government of
E required industry X to incorporate the cost of water cleanup into its price for
domestic sales only. In this case widgets could be sold domestically for $2 per
widget and in foreign markets for $1 per widget. E would thus create a strong
incentive for X to send most of its widgets across its border.
Unfortunately, this scenario, though possible, seems highly unlikely. X would
find it difficult to separate the cost of environmental controls between its domestic sales and foreign sales since X probably would not run separate production lines for each market. Because allocation to different markets is not usually
made until after production, a separate production costing for both domestic and
foreign markets is unlikely. What is more likely is that if X is forced to incorporate the cost of environmental controls for some widgets, it will incorporate
the cost over the entire production. By incorporating the cost of environmental
controls into the cost of the entire production process, X will thereby be raising
the marginal production cost of each widget, regardless of eventual market.
Thus, if the government does not require environmental controls over the production process, the price of both domestic and foreign products will reflect the
subsidy. Because there will be no difference between these two markets, no
export subsidy will exist.
Although no export subsidy exists, a domestic subsidy may possibly exist. As
mentioned earlier, a domestic subsidy results from governmental programs designed to provide an advantage to producers in the marketplace. 3 5 What makes
a domestic subsidy countervailable is best explained by another reference to the
hypothetical.
If country E does not require strict environmental controls of domestic production, X industry can sell its goods for anything more than $1 per widget and
still make a profit. In country I, industry R also produces widgets under the same
conditions as industry X, but the government of I has instituted requirements for
environmental controls that make the marginal cost of production $2 per widget.
Therefore, to make a profit, industry R must sell widgets for any price above $2
per widget-a difference of $1 per widget between the price that X must command to make a profit. If X exports widgets to I, it will enjoy a competitive price
advantage over industry R as long as the cost of shipment is less than the $1 per
widget selling price differential.
Consequently, although the domestic and foreign sales price of X-made widgets may be the same, E's governmental policy that fails to include a provision
for properly assessing the costs of environmental usage to the producer, X, will
35. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
VOL. 26, NO. 3
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still result in a subsidy for the production of widgets. This subsidy is a domestic
one that should be countervailable if the other requirements of countervailing
duties are met.
This scenario also meets the definition of a domestic subsidy as provided by
U.S. law. The U.S. Code specifically lists the governmental "assumption of any
costs or expenses of manufacture, production, or distribution" as a potential
domestic subsidy program. 36 If one accepts the theory that the cost of environmental controls or cleanup are legitimate production costs, then a governmental
policy that does not require industries to recognize these costs is a subsidy
according to U.S. law.
Thus, assuming that a governmental policy that requires neither strict environmental control over production nor industrial payment for the use of environmental resources is a potential countervailable subsidy, additional examination must be made to determine if such a governmental practice would satisfy the
other requirements for a countervailable subsidy, that is, a specifically targeted
industry, or group of industries or enterprises; 37 the existence of material injury
to one of the importing country's domestic industries; 38 and a means of valuing
the subsidy.
Meeting the test of whether an environmental subsidy specifically targets an
industry or group of industries depends on the definition of a "group of industries" and on recognition by the exporting government of the subsidy. Most
countries, when requiring environmental controls, do not specify different standards for different industries, unless the country has singled out a specific industry that is a more egregious polluter than all other industries. Consequently,
an environmental control requirement that permits only minimal levels of pollutants in rivers as the result of an industry production process will most likely
apply to all industries that eject pollutants into rivers.
Thus, the applicability of the countervailing duty law depends on how one
defines the point of commonality between industries in a "group of industries."
If the common factor among industries in a group is solely similarity of product,
then a difficulty exists in proving that the countervailing duty law is applicable
as a response to an environmental subsidy. If, however, the common factor
among industries of the group is the means or method of production, for example, waste disposal into a river, then the claim that the countervailing duty laws
are applicable to environmental subsidies is easier.
Nevertheless, assuming that the means of production is the focus for defining
the group, and that environmental subsidies meet this test, whether material
injury has occurred must still be determined. Countervailing duties cannot be
levied against an importing country's goods merely because the imported goods

36. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(A)(ii)(IV) (1988).
37. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
38. See GATT, supra note 5, art. VI, para. 5.
FALL 1992
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are more competitively priced than domestic goods-a subsidy must exist. Furthermore, although an exporting government subsidizes an industry, if that industry's exports have no negative impact upon the importing country's similar
domestic industry, a countervailing duty may not be assigned. U.S. law requires
a determination of whether the domestic industry in question has been "materially injured or ... isthreatened with material injury . . . by reason of" the
subsidized imports.
Herein lies another problem with the imposition of countervailing duties. Not
only is "subsidy" subject to amorphous definitions, material injury lacks definitional precision as well. One way of defining "material injury" is to assess
whether the elimination of the imported goods' subsidy via the imposition of a
countervailing duty would benefit the domestic industry. 4° This method is based
on the logic that improved domestic industry performance post countervailing
duty is ex post verification of material injury. However, this logic is flawed.
First, adopting a definition that requires punishment as the means of determining wrongdoing seems wrong. If a country's subsidy proves not to cause
material injury, then the means of determining material injury only causes more
harm. Second, and perhaps more importantly, logically the imposition of any
duty on imported goods will increase their price and make them less competitive with domestic goods. A more precise definition of material injury is thus
required lest the importing country's policies, though designed to counter
subsidies, act merely as trade barriers, thereby further distorting market
efficiency.
Recognizing the definitional problem, U.S. trade law4 1 adopts a multifactored
test for material injury that incorporates a wide variety of economic factors.
"Such analysis relies heavily upon information about the size of the subsidies,
the elasticity of import supply, the elasticities of domestic demand and supply,
and so on." 42 Part of this test focuses on determining the impact of the subsidy
on a specific domestic industry or group of industries, relative to the impact of
other domestic industries on the specific domestic industry claiming "material
injury."
Thus, under U.S. law, for a subsidy to qualify for countervailing measures,
material injury requires that domestic industry be harmed by reason of the sub-

39. 19 U.S.C. § 1671d(b)(l) (1988).
40. Sykes, supra note 11, at 208 ("If the elimination of the subsidies would 'materially' benefit
U.S. producers of competing products, then the subsidized imports will be found to have caused
material injury.").
41. See id.at 203 n.24 ("The GATT Subsidies Code requires the United States and other
signatories to utilize an injury test in countervailing duty investigations involving imports from other
Code signatories); Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT Basic Instruments and Selected Documents
56-83 (26th Supp. 1980).
42. Sykes, supra note 11, at 208; see, e.g., Certain Brass Sheet and Strip, USITC Pub. 2099,
Inv. No. 731-TA-379, at 71-72 (July 1988).
VOL. 26, NO. 3
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sidized imports. 43 Consequently, a causal link must be established between the
presence of a subsidy on imported goods and a negative trend in domestic
industry performance. The causal link is better explained by referring again to
the hypothetical.
Industry X exports widgets from country E to country I. Country E has relaxed
environmental control requirements and consequently subsidizes the production
of X's widgets. 44 In country I, industry R also produces widgets. Because of the
environmental subsidy by country E, X is able to sell its widgets at the same price
in country I as industry R. However, R controls 90 percent of the widget market
in country I and is able to sell all the widgets it can make. X is also able to sell
all the widgets it can make to buyers in Country I, and X controls the remaining
10 percent of the widget industry in country I. Widgets are an important and
necessary part of all automobiles manufactured in country I.
Unfortunately, country I is experiencing a mild economic downturn and its
automobile production has dropped by 5 percent. Both R and X experience a drop
in sales relative to the slowdown in automobile production. Thus, R is only able
to sell the number of widgets equal to 85.5 percent of the preeconomic downturn
market capacity, and X is only able to sell the number of widgets equal to 9.5
percent of the preeconomic downturn market capacity. R argues that the subsidy
enjoyed byX has materially injured it. R argues that if no subsidy existed, it would
be able to sell at the same level as before, despite the downturn in the economy.
In the preceding situation, industry X and country E can argue that the injury
to industry R is not the result of E's environmental subsidy. Instead, the injury
experienced by R is the result of demand elasticity. Furthermore, E's subsidy
provides no advantage to X, the subsidy merely allows X to price its widgets
competitively in I's market. Consequently, the injury to R is not causally connected to the E's subsidy. The subsidy, therefore, may not be countervailed. 45
Thus, to countervail an environmental subsidy, it is necessary to show that a
subsidy exists as a result of an exporting country's government assuming a cost
43. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
44. This statement assumes that some normative consistency exists between each country's
population's valuation of environmental resources. There would be no subsidy if the citizens of the
exporting country are more tolerant of pollution than citizens of the importing country. If tolerance
of pollution were reflective of a market or public choice, and thereby inconsistent between countries,
it would complicate subsidy valuation. However, recognition of this fact would not obviate the
central thesis of finding environmental subsidies-that different countries use different means of
calculating value, which results in a nonlevel playing field with respect to trade and subsidies.
45. For further theoretical elaboration of reasoning why country I should not impose a countervailing duty upon X's goods in the above hypothesis, see Sykes, supra note 11, at 210-11:
Beyond question, domestic finns that compete with subsidized imports may suffer financial difficulties as a result
of such competition, resulting in lost profits and unemployment in the workforce. Thus, competition from subsidized imports may lead to serious economic hardship for workers and their families, a hardship that society may
wish to ameliorate. The hardship that results from competition with subsidized imports, however, is no different
from the hardship that can result from competition with unsubsidized imports or indeed from competition with
domestic firms; the burdens of unemployment and economic dislocation arc the same whatever causes them. For
this reason, individuals dislocated by import competition, "subsidized" or not, arguably should enjoy no greater
entitlement to government assistance than the victims of other competitions; they should enjoy the benefits of the
public safety net programs available to all displaced workers, and no more.
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of an industry's production, that this subsidy qualifies as either an export or
domestic subsidy, and that material injury has been suffered by the importing
country's industry or group of industries as a direct result of the environmental
subsidy. Even after all these requirements, another difficulty facing recognition
and countervailing of environmental subsidies is the determination of their value.
V. Valuing Environmental Subsidies
The biggest problem facing proper valuation of environmental subsidies may
come with attempts to include the cost of environmental cleanup as a component
of the subsidy. The inclusion of cleanup cost would probably prove too difficult
because ascertaining which industry or organization is responsible for what portion of pollution is often impossible. Furthermore, different regions of the world
provide different difficulties for cleanup; such problems are based on the presence
of necessary equipment, know-how, and the like. Consequently, cleanup cost
should not be considered as a component of an environmental subsidy.
The exclusion of cleanup cost does not destroy the relevance of the hypothetical or the saliency of recognizing environmental subsidies. To the contrary this
exclusion indicates that the value of subsidies must come from the perspective of
the cost of prophylactic measures. 46 In the hypothetical, instead of measuring the
subsidy as the cost of river cleanup, the subsidy is measured in terms of the price
per widget of installing the appropriate filters or production facilities such that
future pollution does not occur.
Nevertheless, this valuation method does not completely obviate the difficulties of determining the value of environmental subsidies. If country E does not
require the incorporation of prophylactic measures into its domestic production,
determining a benchmark by which the value of these prophylactics can be
measured is difficult. This difficulty has been previously encountered with regard
to nonmarket economies, and the United States Congress has instituted procedures to deal with these situations.
In the U.S. antidumping law and the Commerce Department's implementing
regulations, U.S. trade laws establish the means for calculating the fair market
value of imports from nonmarket economy countries. 47 A number of alternative
methods for calculating a product's fair market value exist. 48 The most preferred
46. The cost of prophylactic measures does not only include monetary or resource costs. Tolerance of pollution by a country's citizens may be valued and treated as a prophylactic cost.
47. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) (1988); 19 C.F.R. § 353.52 (1991). Despite the reversal of the
Court of International Trade's decision in Continental Steel Corp. v. United States, 614 F. Supp. 548
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1985) (holding that subsidies can exist in nonmarket countries) by the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (holding that subsidization is a market phenomenon which cannot exist in a nonmarket
economy by definition), the methodology developed for the determination of a subsidy is still
applicable for the determination of an environmental subsidy.
48. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b (1988); HouSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 100TH CONG., 1ST
SESS., OVERVIEW AND COMPILATION OF U.S. TRADE STATUrES 41-42 (Comm. Print 1987).
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method is the price of the product in the home market. 49 This method is unsatisfactory for the determination of fair market value given the above discussion
that points out that most environmental subsidies will be countervailable domestic subsidies. 50 Thus, the price in the home market may well be the price in the
foreign market; 5 1 yet, neither price should be considered the fair market price as
both are altered by an environmental subsidy.
Given that home market price is deemed an unreliable determinant of the fair
market price, as it would be if the product possessed an environmental subsidy,
one is then permitted to look to the price at which the product is sold in third
countries other than the United States. 52 Using this procedure, one could determine the fair market price by looking at the price of a similar product in a third
country that did not environmentally subsidize its industrial production.
If no other countries are available for comparison, either because they do not
produce a similar product or because they environmentally subsidize, the fair
market value is permitted to be constructed. 53 "A product's constructed value is
the cost of materials, fabrication, general expenses, and profit. ' 54 The cost of
environmental controls could be included in the category of "general expenses."
If the constructed value still seems unsatisfactory, adopting the methodology
utilized in nonmarket calculations of calculating the market value of the producer's production function is a possibility. 55 In this calculation, production costs

include hours of labor required, raw materials expended, and amounts of energy
consumed, in addition to general expenses and profit. 56 The cost of environmental controls could be imputed in the calculation of raw materials expended or
general expenses.
The major problem with this convoluted means of determining the value of an
environmental subsidy is that it inherently possesses a degree of inaccuracy-a
degree that many may be unwilling to accept. Although Congress has already
"demonstrated its willingness to accept some imperfection in the application of
unfair trade practice laws," 57 the issue readily becomes one of "how much is too
much?"
V. Countervailing Environmental Subsidies-The Best Way Out?
The entire discussion so far demonstrates that there is at least a point of debate
concerning the recognition and countervailing of environmental subsidies. Fur49. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(A) (1988).
50. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.

51. Assuming no transportation costs.
52. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(B) (1988).
53. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(2) (1988).

54. Comment, supra note 6, at 1655; see 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e) (1988) (setting out factors to be
considered in calculating a product's constructed value); 19 C.F.R. § 353.50 (1991).
55. 19 C.F.R. § 353.52 (1991).
56. Id.
57. Comment, supra note 6, at 1652 n.21.
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thermore, the analysis demonstrates that such subsidies could be valued. Nevertheless, the crux of the debate of whether to implement duties in response to
environmental subsidies lies not with their applicability or logic, but with the
issue of whether the inaccuracy inherent in valuation is acceptable. 5 s
One can make a strong academic argument that even if U.S. laws permit the
countervailing of subsidized imports, no action should be taken.5 9 Proponents of
this argument point to the existence of other policies or practices that can be used
to counter the negative effect of the subsidization of imported goods 60 and to the
inflexibility of the countervailing duty laws, which require their imposition "under conditions that may often produce a considerable net welfare loss to the U.S.
economy."6t Furthermore, if one desires to adopt cutthroat trade practices, it is
arguable that an importing country should permit some subsidies as they perpetuate an inefficient resource allocation in the exporting country. As a result, the
subsidies do more harm to the economy of the trading rival than to the importing
country's own economic welfare.6 2
These criticisms rely on the notion that a purely competitive international market is the most desirable. The critics postulate that subsidies do no longterm
harm to an importing country. Indeed, they argue that a subsidy will enhance
the economic welfare of the importing country if product and input markets in the
importing country are perfectly competitive and rapidly adjust to changes. 63

58. Id. at 1651 n.20.
59. See supra note 45, at 210.
60. Sykes, supra note 11, at 210-11 ("[E]ven when subsidized import competition is potentially contrary to the national economic interest, countervailing duties are rarely, if ever, the appropriate policy response in theory or in practice.").
61. Id. at 201; see Goetz, Granet & Schwartz, The Meaning of "Subsidy" and "Injury" in the
CountervailingDuty Law, 6 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 17, 26-29 (1986) (arguing that countervailing
duty laws are not intended to promote efficiency; they only provide protection against injury due to
foreign subsidies).
62. Sykes, supra note 11, at 214 ("Subsidies ... can distort resource allocation and reduce the
subsidizing country's economic welfare."); see JAMES MrrcHELL HENDERSON & RiCHARD E.
QUANDT, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 304-08 (3d ed. 1980) (discussing the use of taxes and subsidies

to correct market failures).
63. Professor Sykes proves this point with the aid of the following graph which represents a
two-country trade with a perfectly competitive market in which imported and domestic production
are perfect substitutes and all U.S. imports come from a single country and all exports of the country
enter the United States and that U.S. producers do not export:
Figure I depicts a market in which the supply of imports S,(l) is perfectly elastic at a price P up
to and beyond the quantity of imports demanded in equilibrium. In other words, any capacity
constraint that might turn the supply curve upward will not be reached. The domestic supply curve,
Sd , is upward sloping. The domestic demand curve is given by D. Market equilibrium is at price
P, with domestic production of Q, and imports of Q* - Q1.
Suppose that [the exporting Government] offers its producers a subsidy that lowers their cost of
production and causes the import supply curve to shift downward to S,(2) by an amount s-it is
now perfectly elastic at price (P - s). The new equilibrium price is then (P - s); domestic
production falls to Q2 , and imports rise to Q** - Q2 .
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Despite the decline in domestic production, U.S. economic welfare has plainly increased as a
result of the subsidy. Before the subsidy, consumer surplus is abP, and producer surplus is Phg.
After the subsidy, producer surplus declines to (P-s)fg, but consumer surplus increases to
ac(P- s). The net increase in economic welfare is given by flbc.
Finally, suppose the United States imposes a countervailing duty equal to s per unit of imports
to offset the effect of the subsidy. That a duty of precisely this amount would not in general be
imposed under existing law is unimportant because the qualitative effects of the duty on U.S.
welfare are the same whatever the size of the duty. From the perspective of U.S. consumers and
producers, the effect of the duty is to shift the import supply curve back to its original position,
and to restore the market equilibrium at P. Consumer surplus is again abP, and domestic producer
surplus is Phg. Tariff revenue to the U.S. government is hbde.
Obviously, U.S. economic welfare is greater than before the subsidy program by the amount of
the tariff revenue. But economic welfare was even greater before the imposition of the countervailing duty-the net loss as a result of the duty is given by the two triangles feh and bdc. A
countervailing duty under these conditions, or any other duty for that matter, assuredly reduces
welfare.
Sykes, supra note 11, 216-18 (footnotes omitted).
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Hence, the imposition of countervailing duties by the importing country "will
often reduce the welfare of the importing country."64
Nevertheless, these critics of countervailing duty laws fail to recognize the
limits of their own assumptions. A perfectly competitive market is a worthwhile
goal. The need for the adoption of policies that move the world economy to a
point of maximum efficiency is indisputable. That normal subsidies are often
more counterproductive than helpful is also indisputable. However, what occurs
with environmental subsidies is most probably not predation or some other form
of deliberate market distortion, but merely the failure of adequate cost assessment.
The growing environmental movement has publicly demonstrated that most
economic industrial decisions treat environmental costs as externalities not subsequently incorporated into production cost assessments. The countervailing of
environmental subsidies should produce the beginning of worldwide internalization of environmental costs into calculations of production costs. To rely merely
on an inefficient market to eventually internalize these costs may prove to be an
inadequate response.
It is recognized, however, that producers have no incentive to internalize
environmental costs and include them in their costs of production unless the
producers are required by the consumption demands of purchasers of their products or of a government. 65 In answering the question of whether the inaccuracies
inherent in the valuation of environmental subsidies are worth the costs associated with countervailing duties, 6 6 one should recognize that countervailing duties
may have more than one purpose. Clearly, the primary purpose of these duties is
to correct policies that create transaction-specific market inefficiencies. However, a second purpose may be to correct for policy inefficiencies such as the
failure of most producers to internalize the costs of environmental controls in
their overall production costs.
64. Id. at 214. Professor Sykes states that:
The principal caveat to this last proposition is that duties may improve the "terms of trade" for the importing
country. A second caveat relates to the question whether countervailing duties may deter subsidization altogether
andthereby confer benefits on producers in the importing country who must compete with subsidized goods in their
export markets,

Id. at 214-15 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted). Furthermore, Sykes argues that countervailing duties, even if not harming the importing country's economy, may cause disproportionate harm
to overseas markets and the ability of the importing country to compete in those overseas markets.
Id. at 215 ("Indeed, the effects of a countervailing duty on U.S. economic welfare will often be
determined entirely by its effects in the U.S. home market. But if a countervailing duty leads the
subsidizing country to abandon or curtail its subsidy program, or otherwise affects market prices
overseas, and if U.S. firms export to those overseas markets, then the effects of the duty on U.S.
exporters must also be considered.").
65. It is understood that a government's regulating authority is required only when the costs of
making the bargain are too high for private negotiation.
66. These costs include an increased potential for retaliatory or strategic response by trading
partners that would eliminate the gains, the costs to the government of administering the countervailing duty laws, and the rent-seeking expenditures of domestic producer groups seeking to avail
themselves of protection. See id. at 215.
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The existence of multiple purposes for applying trade laws is consistent with
the growth of the "strategic trade policy" industry, which offers justification for
all types of intervention in trade. 6 7 A number of scholars acknowledge the appeal
of many of these "strategic" arguments and subsequently reject them on the basis
that the informational and administrative burdens required to ascertain whether
their implementation achieves the desired success are too great to warrant the
adoption of such policies. 68 Furthermore, most proponents of strategic trade policy provide justification for continuing the indiscriminate application of current
countervailing duties, albeit for strategic reasons, that have been assaulted earlier.
However, the rejection of the continuing applicability of current countervailing
duty laws does not require the rejection of all countervailing duty laws. The
existence of some defects in the countervailing duty laws of the United States is
acknowledged. First, there does seem to be saliency in the argument that some
subsidies should not be countervailed because the distortion of the exporting
country's economy is de minimis when compared to the development of other
highly valued international norms. Such norms include famine relief or educational or governmental reform. Indeed, it is arguable that this assumption has
been recognized in part by article XVII of the GATT, which provides different
standards for developing countries.
Second, although the argument for countervailing subsidies is predicated on
the assumption of two results-expansion of the domestic market and compensation for unfair trading practice 69-this predicate does not guarantee that duties
are properly calculated. For example, in acknowledging the principles of
Cournot-Nash, 70 "the optimal duty was not equal to the amount of the subsidy,
but was equal to one-half of the subsidy, plus adjustment for differences between
domestic and foreign marginal costs." 7' Thus, countervailing duty laws may be
67. See generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, JOHN PANzAR & ROBERT D. WILLG, CONTESTABLE
MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982); Paul R. Krugman, Is Free Trade Passe?,

I J. ECON. PERsP., Fall 1987, at 131; James Brander, Rationalesfor Strategic Trade and Industrial
Policy, in STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 23 (Paul R. Krugman
ed., 1986); James Brander & Barbara Spencer, Tariff Protection and Imperfect Competition, in
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 194 (Henry K. Kierzkowski ed., 1984).

68. Sykes, supra note 11, at 255:
Ultimately, however, this scenario does not provide a convincing basis for the imposition of countervailing duties.
Even if foreign governments could be expected to react passively, the information necessary to ascertain the
welfare consequences of a duty would include detailed knowledge of worldwide cost and demand conditions and
an understanding of the strategic interaction among domestic and foreign oligopolists. It seems clear that such
information could not be reliably developed.

See Grossman, StrategicExport Promotion:A Critique, in STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY AND THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 47-68 (Paul R. Krugman ed., 1986).

69. Avinash K. Dixit, International Trade Policy for Oligopolistic Industries, 94 ECON. J. 1,
10-12 (Supp. 1984) ("Intuitively, any net gain to national economic welfare comes from a combination of two phenomena discussed above-the rent extraction effect of the duty and an expansion
of domestic firms at the expense of foreign firms due to the protection of the domestic market.").
70. Coumot-Nash behavior is that in which each actor assumes that changing its behavior will not
cause the changing of others' behavior. See James A. Brander & Barbara S. Spencer, Export Subsidies and InternationalMarket Share Rivalry, 18 J. INT'L ECON. 83, 83-85 (1985).
71.

Sykes, supra note 11, at 255.
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improved. Acknowledging that there may be a need to reevaluate how countervailing duties are determined, however, does not necessarily pose a threat to the
existence of countervailing duties altogether. The merits of imposing countervailing duties to counter environmental subsidies may outweigh the costs of their
imposition.
VII. Conclusion
The world community is beginning to deal with the tremendous environmental
problems it faces. Working to solve these environmental problems involves not
only cleaning up past polluting mistakes, but engendering new policies such that
the rate of pollution is seriously curtailed and eventually eliminated. Some of the
necessary solutions may come from the rethinking of traditional industrial practices. Unfortunately, international progress in this sphere is hampered by the
reliance of reform efforts in the development of "soft" law. Fortunately, "hard"
law may be applied to effect change in some instances. Most interesting of these
instances is the identification and acceptance of the notion that producers should
incorporate the costs of pollution from their production processes into their
estimates of total production costs.
If one accepts the merits of requiring producers to internalize the environmental costs of their production processes, it is not too great a leap in logic to
ascertain that a governmental policy that does not require producers to incorporate these costs qualifies as a governmental subsidy of industrial production
costs. These subsidies may be countervailable.
Countervailing these subsidies arguably will improve market efficiency. One
may assert that these subsidies can be classified at least as domestic subsidies and
that they can be shown to target a specific group of industries. It may possibly
also be shown that these subsidies cause material injury to those domestic industries in countries, like the United States, that force producers to adopt environmental safeguards in their production processes.
The biggest hurdle to be overcome in accepting the practice of countervailing
environmental subsidies is the proper valuation of these subsidies. Though
proper valuation may be a difficult task, it should be attempted. Typical arguments against strategic trade policy are not directly applicable to the issue of
environmental subsidies because one primary purpose of countervailing these
subsidies is to improve the costing of industrial production. Countervailing environmental subsidies does not demand that current countervailing duty laws
retain their present form, only that they remain in existence.
Recognizing and countervailing environmental subsidies appears to be a viable
option for developing an international environmental consensus. Such action allows states to take advantage of "hard" law and effect change in the production
processes of exporting trade partners. Although this article has not analyzed each
facet of such a policy, it indicates that the potential use of international trade policy
to help establish international environmental norms is worthy of consideration.
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